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REMOVING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE FROM
EMPLOYER AND STATE CONTROL: THE ACA AS ANTISUBORDINATION LEGISLATION
W. David Koeninger *

In trying to explain why the United States, unlike every other
western industrial democracy, lacks a national health care system,
refonners usually tell a story about labor unions and large
corporations each taking advantage of favorable post-World War II
conditions to forge an alliance in their mutual interest, creating our
system of employer-based health insurance. I Thus, the story goes,
our failure to agree upon the need for a national health plan results
from "the American health policy trap,"-what Paul Starr has
described as "a system of employer-provided insurance that conceals
its true costs from those who benefit from it."2 However, an
examination of the claims of those aligned against the
implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA)3 suggests that this is not the full story.
The federal government's first meaningful involvement in health
care came during Reconstruction, as the Freedman's Bureau sought
to address the health needs of fonner slaves. 4 Then, as now, there
was deep concern over how much government involvement was
necessary and the "danger" of instilling dependence on the
government in otherwise able-bodied individuals. 5
Thus, the
American health care system has exhibited what Nicole Huberfeld
*

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Deputy Director, Vennont Legal Aid, Inc., Burlington, Vermont. The author also
wishes to thank the Center for Applied Feminism and the participants in the Applied
Feminism and Health Conference for their support and feedback on this piece.
Special thanks go to Rebecca Zietlow for her helpful comments and constant
encouragement, and to Alice and Zoe Koeninger for being their inspirational selves.
Finally, thanks to the editors of the Law Review, especially Marie Long.
See PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE OVER
HEALTH CARE REFORM 42 (2011) [hereinafter STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION].
See id. at 122-23.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
See JIM DOWNS, SICK FROM FREEDOM: AFRICAN-AMERICAN ILLNESS AND SUFFERING
DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 45-46 (2012).
ld. at 72.
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has called "path dependence"-with access to health care linked to
labor for the able-bodied and linked to frailty for those who would
rely on government programs. 6 Further, access to health care became
a means of control-for employers to control their workers and state
governments to control their citizens.7 To those who oppose the
ACA, that statute is dangerous precisely because it threatens this state
of affairs, allowing workers to obtain health care independently from
employment and attempting to nationalize the Medicaid program
over state objections.
At its passage, the Affordable Care Act was seen by many as a civil
rights enactment, with South Carolina Congressman James Clyboum
describing it as the "civil rights act of the twenty-first century."8 And
yet, of all the briefs filed before the Supreme Court in NFIB v.
Sebelius,9 only the amicus brief of the National Women's Law Center
actually argued that the ACA should be upheld as civil rights
legislation within the ambit of the Commerce Clause (remedying
discrimination against women).IO Many of the lawsuits filed to
challenge the ACA have implicated women's access to birth control
and family planning. II Almost all of the challenges implicate access
to health care as a means of control, a means of reducing worker
autonomy and usurping women's sexual autonomy.

6.

7.

8.

9.
10.
11.

See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 439 n.31
(2011) [hereinafter Huberfeld, Federalizing MedicaidJ; Nicole Huberfeld et aI.,
Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REv. 1, 10 (2013) [hereinafter Huberfeld
et aI., Plunging into Endless Difficulties] (describing the American healthcare system
as path-dependent).
See STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 1, at 47; PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 312 (1982) [hereinafter STARR, SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION)'
JOHN E. McDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 305 (2011); see also Hagop
Kantarjian, Parallels Between the Affordable Care Act and the Civil Rights Act of
1964, BAKER INST. BLOG (June 9, 2014),
http://blog.chron.comlbakerblogl2014/06/parallels-between-the-affordable-care-actand-the-civil-rights-act-of-1964/ (comparing divisions in Congress and differences of
opinion over the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from 50 years ago with the current divisive
debate over the Affordable Care Act). One of my contentions in this article is that, as
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the dislike of the ACA is significantly motivated by
racial considerations.
Nat'l Fed'n ofIndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
See W. David Koeninger, The Statute Whose Name We Dare Not Speak: EMTALA
and the Affordable Care Act, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 139, 177 & n.276 (2013).
See, e.g., Grote Industries, LLC v. SebeJius, 914 F. Supp. 2d 943, 945-48 (S.D. Ind.
2012); Monaghan v. Sebelius, 931 F. Supp. 2d 794,797-99 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
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In order for the ACA to be an effective reform of our health care
system and to achieve its anti-subordination goals, supporters must
focus the debate over the ACA's various requirements on those who
will benefit from its policy reforms, which are designed to reduce
health disparities and remedy the effects of race and gender
discrimination. Thus, in these cases, feminists can help the cause of
health care justice by invoking anti-subordination theory in support
of the challenged provisions of the ACA.12
In Part I, I will describe the historical use of access to health care as
a means of controlling workers and low-income, often minority,
citizens. Part II will discuss how key provisions of the ACA, its
health care exchanges, mandatory benefits, federal subsidies, and
Medicaid expansion, operate to liberate individuals from employer
and state government control. Part III will review some of the types
of lawsuits filed to challenge the implementation of the ACA,
particularly the Hobby Lobby!3 decision and others implicating
women's access to healthcare. Finally, Part IV will suggest an antisubordination view of health care reform that can serve as a means of
responding to ACA lawsuits and supporting the implementation of
the ACA.
I.

PATH-DEPENDENT HEALTH CARE: ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES

Nicole Huberfeld has used the term "path-dependent" to describe
the Medicaid program.14 Put simply, "path dependence" denotes the
idea that history may dictate a set of rules relating to a specific
choice, making that choice much less deliberate, and therefore less
voluntary, than it might have been without the initial set of
decisions. 15 In government health care programs, and in our publicprivate health care system generally, path dependence has proven to
be critical; past decisions influence future decisions. 16 Given the
significance of past decisions, this Part will examine briefly some of
the history of the American government's involvement in health care
and the development of our employer-based health care system.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Anti-subordination theory focuses on ending the race or gender-based practices that
perpetuate historical discrimination. See infra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014).
Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 6, at 439 & n.3l.
Id.
See id. at 438-39 & n.31; see also Huberfeld et aI., Plunging into Endless Difficulties,
supra note 6, at 10.
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Such a review is necessary in order to highlight the manner in
which our health care system has evolved, with its emphasis on work
vs. dependence, the worthy vs. the unworthy, the deserving vs. the
undeserving, and its incorporation of discriminatory societal norms
dating back to Reconstruction. In both governmental programs and
employer-sponsored plans, these themes repeat and recur over time.
Therefore, advocates must understand this history in order to respond
to challenges to the ACA, which is intended to undo these emphases
and dissolve the discriminatory norms that have been woven into our
health care system.

A.

Reconstruction - Establishing Health Care Themes

In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation
Proclamation, freeing the slaves but putting the health of many
freedpeople at risk. l ? Four million formerly enslaved persons were
now free to seek work but, if they could not find it, they would be
subject to hunger, lack of housing, and ultimately sickness and
disease. 18 It was not until 1865 that the federal government
established the Freedman's Bureau to address some of the
consequences of emancipation. 19 This included the first-ever federal
health care program. 20
The process is described in Jim Downs' book, Sick From Freedom:
African American Illness and Suffering During the Civil War and
Reconstruction. 21 As Downs explains, the federal government's
intervention in health matters in the South included two critical
emphases.
First, "[t]he federal government's obsession with
freedpeople's labor . . . circumscribed how freedpeople's health
would be defined and who would define it."22 That is, the federal
government's primary interest in the health of freed slaves was linked
to its desire to take advantage of their labor power,23 and those who
were not able-bodied were forcibly separated from those who could
work. 24 Thus, the notion that an employer or governmental authority
could define health for the purpose of taking advantage of an
individual's labor power has been woven into our health care system
for 150 years.
Second, because of the federal government's
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See DOWNS, supra note 4, at 42-52.
Id. at 8, 166-70.
Id.at45.
Id.
Id. at 45-46.
Id. at 64.
See id. at 45.
/d. at 121.
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obsession with freedpeople's labor, every aspect of its medical
program in the South gave rise to anxiety that providing government
health care to able~bodied individuals would render them dependent
on the federal government. 25 This anxiety was so pervasive that in
the end, the constant pressure, to reduce relief and medical aid
"undermined the operations or' the first-ever federal health care
program. "26
These three themes-the definition of health as the ability to
provide labor, evaluated by a third party employer or government
entity; the emphasis on tailoring benefit programs to aid those who
are not able-bodied or (as with children) are not able to work; and the
corrosive anxiety about creating government dependence by
providing assistance to the able-bodied-recur throughout the history
of health care delivery in the United States.27 Moreover, they entwine
with race and gender in ways that we are still attempting to unwind.
For example, in her work, Professor Huberfeld discusses the idea of
the "deserving" and undeserving poor and locates it in the
Elizabethan poor laws. 28 However, the three themes described by
Downs suggest that, after the Civil War, notions of the worthy and
unworthy poor became inextricably linked with race. 29
From the 1880s onward, the federal government would have little
direct involvement in the health of its citizens. 30 In the meantime, the
25.
26.

27.

28.
29.

Id. at 72.
Id. at 73-74. Indeed, the congressional debates over the Freedman's Bureau produced
a curious tension that ultimately characterized the Bureau's work: a desire to help
emancipated slaves mitigated by the longstanding congressional hesitancy to exercise
full powers in health matters and by the concern that providing anything more than
temporary assistance would engender dependence on the government among the
emancipated. See id.
See generally Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra !lote 6 (discussing the two
themes of "the deserving poor" and "states' rights"). As the American health system
developed, private businesses made the conscious choice to provide health care to
their workers in order to avoid the perceived larger evil of expanding the federal
government's involvement in health care. See infra Part II.
Huberfeld et aI., Plunging into Endless Difficulties, supra note 6, at 13.
See Karen Ross, Civil War, Emancipation, and the Struggle for Health and Freedom,
H-SOUTH (July 2013), http://www.h-net.orglreviews/showrev.php?id=36498; Jennifer
Schuessler, Liberation as Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2012),
ht1p:llwww.nytimes.coml2012106llI/books/sick-from-freedom~by-jim-downs-about-freed

30.

slaves.htm1?pagewanted=all&_r=O; see also supra notes ICr-27 and accompanying text.
There was little change in the "abominable" health status of blacks from the end of
Reconstruction until the beginning of the Great Depression. See ALONDRA NELSON,
BODY AND SOUL: THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE FIGHT AGAINST MEDICAL
DISCRIMINATION 26 (2011).
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expanded use of the concept of the worthy poor was reinforced by a
substantial body of racist literature and research. 31 Blacks, for their
part, engaged actively in developing their own medical institutions
and research in order to counter the spread of scientific racism. 32
Simultaneously, though, social reformers were embracing eugenics as
a means of alleviating poverty, forging links between the concept of
racial inferiority and the term "the undeserving poor."33 While these
reformers may have been well-intentioned researchers attempting to
understand the causes of poverty, they ultimately contributed to the
use of the term "the undeserving poor" as an excuse for
discrimination on the basis of race and gender.

B.

Post-World War II: Foundations a/the Current System

The practice of providing access to health care through
employment fits neatly with Reconstruction-era concerns about
ensuring a healthy workforce and avoiding the creation of
dependence on the government. Prior to the late 1940s, employee
health care had not been a subject of collective bargaining, with both
employers and unions attempting to use medical care as a means of
cementing greater worker loyalty. 34 Employers, of course, also
wanted to be able to say when injured workers were fit enough to
return to work; and so they developed the institution of the company
doctor. 35
It was not until the Supreme Court's ruling in the Inland Steel case
in 1949 that it became clear that employee benefits plans were part of
the terms and conditions of employment that could be subjects of

31.

32.

33.
34.

35.

See id. at 42-48. For example, in 1896, Frederick L. Hoffman published Race Traits
and Tendencies in the American Negro, an influential tract of scientific racism,
claiming that the higher mortality rates of blacks could be attributed to "racially weak
biological inheritance and the ill-effects of emancipation." Id. at 44.
ALONDRA NELSON, supra note 30, at 24-32, 36-38, 43-46. The fact that such racist
attitudes have persisted and continued to influence health care policy is not a measure
of ineffectiveness on the part of Black scientists and educators, but rather an example
of the tenacity of racism itself and the power of narrative to justify path-dependent
decisions.
See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: AMERICAN'S ENDURING
CONFRONTATION WITH POVERTY 29-39 (2d ed. 2013).
See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 312 (describing "[the]
management tradition of company-run medical services, strong in the mining, lumber,
and textile industries, and a union tradition of labor-run clinics and insurance
programs, strong only in the garment industry.").
See id. at 312,317; see also John George, The Return of the Company Doctor, PHiLA.
Bus. J. (May 1, 2014, 8:55 AM), http://www.b~oumals.comlphi1adelphia/bloglhea1th
carel2014/05/the-retum-of-the-company-doctor.htrnl?page=all.
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collective bargaining. 36 Unions, which initially had hoped for a
program of government-sponsored national health insurance,
accepted this state of affairs because it enabled them to claim
collective bargaining victories while providing their members with a
significant benefit. 37 Unfortunately, this system did not, and never
really has, served the interests of retirees, the unemployed, the selfemployed, or those who work at low-paying jobs that do not provide
fringe benefits.38 Moreover, the employment-based system that
developed left the ability of employers to define health for their
employees largely intact. 39 Employers benefited most by avoiding
mandated national health insurance and retaining control over the
choice of an insurance carrier and other plan details. 40
By 1958, the paradigm for the next several decades had been set: a
family's likelihood of having health insurance depended on its total
income and the employment situation of the chiefbreadwinner. 41 If a
family's income was in the top third of the population and the main
earner was fully employed, there was a 78 percent chance of the
family having health insurance. 42 "Where the main earner was
employed in manufacturing, the chance of having insurance was 91
percent."43 Additionally, "[t]wo-thirds of those who lived in the
Northeast, the Midwest, or the West had some insurance," compared
to "only about half of those who lived in the South."44 Even private
sector health care access tracked patterns from the Reconstruction
era. 45

C.

Medicare and Medicaid

Though they are often confused, Medicare and Medicaid may be
distinguished fairly easily-Medicare is for older people (over age
65), and Medicaid is for poor people (depending on the particular

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 313.
See id. at 330,333.
Jd. at 333.
See id. at 314.
Jd.
Jd. at 334.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
Compare DOWNS, supra note 4, at 64, 72 with STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION,
supra note 7, at 334 (demonstrating that unions had failed to improve access to health
care in the same part of the country where the Freedman's Bureau had failed to
improve access to health care nearly a century earlier).
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state's definition of poverty).46 Congress, when it enacted both
programs, actually thought of them as the sum of three parts. 47
Medicare Part A covered hospital care for the elderly.48 Medicare
Part B covered out-patient care for the elderly.49 Medicaid was the
third and least popular part, providing medical insurance for those
dependent on government financial assistance, such as women and
children deemed eligible for the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) cash-assistance welfare program, and single, adult
males eligible for either Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled
or Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled. 50 In a striking illustration of
path dependence, the two War on Poverty-era programs track the
lines drawn by the Freedmen's Bureau for the administration of its
aid during Reconstruction. The aid to be provided by the government
through Medicaid and Medicare would assist only those who, by
necessity or by definition, were dependent on the government and not
those otherwise considered to be able-bodied. 51
Notwithstanding this similarity, the programs were, and continue to
be, supported by different payment schemes, creating significant
differences between them. 52 Those differences also track distinctions
originating from the Reconstruction era. 53 The Medicaid Act created
a program of cooperative federalism paid for by both state and
federal governments. 54 In contrast, Medicare is a freestanding,
entirely federal, program available to all who have qualified for

46.

47.

48.
49.
50.

51.
52.

53.
54.

See STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 1, at 46-47 (pointing out that because
welfare eligibility standards differed among the states, it might be easier to qualifY for
Medicaid in a wealthier state like New York than in a comparatively poorer state like
Mississippi); see also Medicare Versus Medicaid, MEDICARE MADE CLEAR
http://www.medicaremadeclear.comlaboutlmedicare-vs-medicaidl (last updated July
30,2014,3:15 PM).
STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 369.
See id.
See id.
See 42 U.S.c. §§ 1351, 1382(a)(I), 1396a(a)(lO)(A)(i) (2012); STARR, SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 369; What is AFDC?, CENSUS.GOV (Oct. 21,
2011), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/statbriefs/whatAFDC.htm\.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(i)-(xiii); STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at
370.
See Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 6, at 446-47; How is Medicare
MEDlCARE.Gov,
http://www.medicare.gov/about-uslhow-medicare-isFunded?,
fundedlmedicare- funding.html (last visited Jan. II, 2015).
See DOWNS, supra note 4, at 46; STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at
370.
See Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 6, at 447.
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social security benefits by paying into the social security system. 55 It
has never been associated with welfare programs. 56 Medicare also
always has had uniform national standards for eligibility and
benefits. 57
D. Biological Citizenship: Critiquing Medicaid and Medicare
While Medicaid and Medicare undoubtedly expanded access to
health care for millions, those programs did not end medical
discrimination, and their subtle reinforcement of the divide between
the worthy and unworthy poor was seen by some as validating racial
health disparities. Accordingly, they inspired criticism from some
activists on the political left. 58 For example, to the Black Panther
Party, programs such as Medicaid and Medicare were insufficient
because "marginalized communities were left with an anemic if
sometimes efficacious form of biological inclusion in the place of
racial equality, social justice, and economic citizenship."59 In other
words, the Black Panthers were critical of the Medicare and Medicaid
programs because they incorporated the limits on governmental
involvement in health care that arose during Reconstruction.
In order to have access to health care, applicants were required to
demonstrate their "damaged biology," thereby maintaining the racist
myth that blacks were biologically inferior. 60 According to the
myths, of course, blacks were inferior because they did not want,
could not get, or would not keep jobs, so they could not get health
care through employment or would not earn enough to qualify for
Medicare. 61 However, if they were willing to present themselves as
damaged and dependent on the government, as welfare moms and
children, or as sick and disabled adults, they could get health care
from the government (i.e., Medicaid).62 What they wanted was equal

55.
56.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-15(c) (2012); STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7,
at 369-70.
See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 370; Basic Introduction to
Medicare, MEDICAREADVOCACY.ORG, http;llwww.medicareadvocacy.orgimedicareinfo/medicare-basics-21 (last visited Jan. 11,2015).
See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 370.
NELSON, supra note 30, at 14.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 184-85.
See KATZ, supra note 33, at 29-39 (describing hereditarian and environmental
"explanations" for poverty and the lack of economic success among blacks).
NELSON, supra note 30, at 184-86.
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citizenship; what they got was stigma. 63 As will be shown in Part II,
the Panthers critique has proven to be right, as opponents of the ACA
have sought to oppose the expansion of Medicaid by characterizing it
simultaneously as a program for those who are dependent and a
program that creates dependence among its recipients.
II.

THE ACA: CHALLENGING PATH DEPENDENCE

Other than some expansions to Medicaid and Medicare and the rise
of HMOs in the private sector, there was little change from 1986 to
2008, in the manner in which Americans could access health care. 64
In the 1990s, Hilary Clinton was tasked with developing and passing
reform but was soundly defeated by the insurance industry. 65 Thus,
immediately prior to the enactment of the ACA, the components of
the American health care system could be summarized as follows: a
federal government program operated under federal standards for
retired and disabled workers (Medicare);66 a joint federal-state
program for disabled individuals with no work history and poor
children (and sometimes their parents), with eligibility, payment, and
coverage standards ultimately set by states with an eye toward
limiting individual dependence on government programs
(Medicaid);67 and a system of private insurance primarily provided
through employers that selected the carrier and coverage that would

63.

64.

65.
66.

67.

Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE LJ.
1563, 1576-77 (1996) (book review describing the distinction between "citizens" who
are entitled to government assistance and "subjects" who receive assistance only at the
government's discretion).
See Timeline: History of Health Reform in the u.s., KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files. wordpress.coml20 11 /03/5 -02-13 -history-of-healthreform.pdf (last visited Jan. 11,2015).
See STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 1, at 113-19; JOHN DITTMER, THE
GOOD DOCTORS 247 (2009).
See McDONOUGH, supra note 8, at 23-24, 156 (noting that prior to the enactment of
the Affordable Care Act, approximately 46 million Americans were covered by
Medicare, of which approximately 8 million were disabled and under the age of sixtyfive); see also supra Part I.e.
See id; see also STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 1, at 46-47 (explaining
that states have the discretion to limit the perceived danger that receipt of Medicaid
will lead to increased dependence on the government by narrowing eligibility criteria,
and reducing the scope of the services offered, as well as the payments offered to
health-care providers, and that such restrictions are consistent with the perception that
Medicaid recipients have an inferior moral claim to their benefits); see also supra Part

I.e.
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be provided to their employees. 68 This system remained rife with
disparities based on race and income.
The ACA proposed69 to do several things that would challenge the
path dependence of our health care system; expanding Medicaid and
changing its eligibility methodology to a purely financial one;
requiring large employers to provide health insurance to their
employees or face a fine; and creating subsidized health care
exchanges that would enable individuals to purchase affordable
health insurance independently of the terms and conditions of their
employment. 70 It also proposed to invade the employer's prerogative
to determine which benefits it would provide to its employees by
mandating that large employers include specific items of preventive
care in their benefits packages. 71

A.

The Medicaid Expansion

As originally written, the ACA expansion would have created nearuniform eligibility across the nation based on a single method of
counting income without categorical distinctions. 72 Whether working
or not, nearly all individuals with family incomes below 133% of the
federal poverty level would be eligible for benefits on an equal
basis.73 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court made that optionaU4
In doing so, the Court held that the Medicaid expansion was not an
addition to the old Medicaid program, like the other program
expansions enumerated above, but an entirely new program. 75 This,
of course, is only true if one thinks of Medicaid as a program solely
68.

See McDONOUGH, supra note 8, at 23-24 (explaining that while other developed

72.

nations relied on public health care, the United States utilized a system of private
health insurance provided primarily through employers, and only later created
Medicare and Medicaid to assist those unable to secure private insurance); see also
supra Part LB.
Given that the employer mandate still has not been fully implemented, it seems
appropriate to refer to the ACA's terms as proposals. See Mark A. Hall, Evaluating
the Affordable Care Act: The Eye of the Beholder, 51 Hous. L. REv. 1029, 1051
(2014) (noting that the employer mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act will
not take effect until 2015).
See McDONOUGH, supra note 8, at 124, 127 (discussing how subsidies will be used to
make the purchase of health insurance more affordable, and how exchanges will
provide a marketplace through which individuals can purchase health insurance); see
also infra Part I1.B.
See infra Part II.C.
McDoNOUGH, supra note 8, at 152.

73.
74.
75.

See id.
See Nat'l Fed'n ofIndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
Id. at 2605-06.

69.

70.

71.
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for the dependent or biologically dependent rather than as a needbased health care program. Essentially, Justice Roberts's thinking
reverts to the Freedman's Bureau model, holding that a program to
help the indigent and disabled is one thing, but a program in which
able-bodied persons with low-incomes can access health care is a
"shift in kind, not merely degree."76 Put more bluntly, it was a shift
to a program that would cover both the deserving and the
undeserving poor.
The consequences of an optional Medicaid expansion program are
now clear. Despite incredibly attractive federal reimbursement
rates-lOO% initially and then gradually declining to 90%-23 states
have not yet chosen to accept federal funding to expand Medicaid. 77
A study conducted by the Urban Institute, Ohio State University, and
the Health Policy Institute of Ohio (HPIO) gives some idea of the
money at stake in the states and therefore the overwhelming power of
the traditional distinction between the worthy and the unworthy
poor.78 The HPIO found that the state of Ohio could save $1.6 billion
over 10 years by expanding Medicaid. 79 Yet, despite the enormous
projected savings, Ohio's governor still was forced to outmaneuver
the legislature in order to implement the Medicaid expansion in
Ohio.80 In an effort to make sure only the worthy poor receive aid,
current efforts to expand Medicaid in Utah include proposals that
would require expansion recipients to accept the state's help in
finding work. 8l
76.
77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

Id.
Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
http://kff.orglhealth-reformlslide/current-status-of-the-medicaid-expansion-decision!
(last updated Dec .. 17,2014).
See Expanding Medicaid in Ohio: Analysis of Likely Effects, HEALTH POL'y INST. OF
OHIO 1,6 (Mar. 2013), http://www.healthpolicyohio.orglwp-contentl
uploads/20 14/0 lImedicaidexpansionstudy_brieCfinal_022620131.pdf.
See id. at 22; see also Robert Higgs, Ohio Medicaid Costs Expected to be $470
Million Lower than Anticipated, CLEVELAND. COM (Nov.
7, 2014),
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.sstl2014/1I1ohios_medicaid_costs_expected.html
(attributing lower current Medicaid costs to the state's ability to enroll recipients in
expanded Medicaid, the cost of which is borne entirely by the federal government).
See State ex rei. Cleveland Right to Life v. State of Ohio Controlling Bd., 3 N.E.3d
185, 190 (Ohio 2013) (upholding the action of the Ohio Controlling Board granting
the state Medicaid agency authority to spend federal Medicaid expansion funds). It is
worth noting that the Controlling Board's approval only lasts until the end of the
current budget biennium, June 30,2015, raising the possibility that Ohio may re-visit
its Medicaid expansion decision at that time. See id.
Steve Benen, Utah Poised to Join Medicaid Expansion States, MSNBC (Sept. 12,
2014, 4:45 PM), http://www.msnbc.comlrachel-maddow-show/utah-poised-joinedmedicaid-expansion-states.
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It is significant that the Medicaid expansion income methodology
eliminates one of the oldest storylines in the mythology of the
deserving and the undeserving poor-the "man-in-the-house" case. 82
The man-in-the-house case is exemplified by the facts in King v.
Smith, in which the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama statute
governing eligibility for cash welfare assistance that attributed the
income of any man with whom a single woman was cohabiting to the
household of that woman. 83
The statute further defined
"cohabitation" to include any man and woman having "'frequent or
continuing' sexual relations," regardless of whether the man lived
with the woman. 84 Specifically, the Court held that while a state
might wish to discourage "illicit sexual behavior and illegitimacy," it
could not do so through the statutory scheme setting forth the
eligibility requirements for cash assistance. 85 Despite the Court's
ruling, states still were permitted to count the income of unrelated
adults determined to be living in the recipient's household to
determine Medicaid eligibility, until the implementation of the
ACA's Medicaid expansion. 86
The Medicaid expansion adopts "Modified Adjusted Gross
Income" (MAGI)-essentially, the income that would be reported on
the front page of an individual or family's federal income tax formas its sole eligibility criterion. 87 By doing so, it eliminates inquiries
into the recipient's living situation: the only income with which the
82.

83.
84.

85.
86.

87.

See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968) (striking down the Alabama
eligibility statute for the AFDC program that attributed the income of any man with
whom a single woman "cohabits" to the household of that woman); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 334, 337 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (referring to approval of state
AFDC plans that contain a "man-in-the-house" provision).
Id. at 311-12.
ld. at 313-14. In the case of Ms. Smith, her caseworker determined that she was
having an affair with a married man and attributed his income to her household even
though he was not the father of any of her children and lived in a separate household
with his wife and nine children. ld. at 315.
ld. at 334.
See, e.g., Mississippi Division of Medicaid Eligibility Policies and Procedures Manual
Chapter 102.08.02, at 1250 (eff. 2009)
http://www.medicaid.ms.gov/wp-contentluploads/2014/04/Chapterl02Page12501252.pdf (describing how to determine if an unmarried couple is engaged in a
"holding out" relationship, in which the couple holds itself out to the community as
married, and explaining that "holding out" couples are considered married for the
purpose of evaluating financial eligibility for the Aged, Blind and Disabled Medicaid
program).
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14) (2012), amended by Act of Mar. 23, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111148, § 2002(a), 124 Stat. 279 (ACA application of the MAGI group to Medicaid).
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state need be concerned is what is required to be reported on the
recipient's federal income tax form. 88 The income of unrelated
adults, even if living in the same household, is not counted. 89 Thus,
the expansion enables women's sexual autonomy, removing the link
between access to health care and "appropriate" sexual behavior or
status as one of the deserving poor.

B.

Private Insurance from a Non-Employer Source: The Individual
Mandate and Access to the Exchanges

Along with reducing government control over the behavior of
Medicaid recipients, the ACA also loosens the overall connection
between employment and access to health care. In NFIB v. Sebelius,
the Supreme Court found that the taxing power permitted the federal
government to compel citizens of the individual states to purchase
health insurance pursuant to the so-called "individual mandate."9o
Thus, individuals became responsible for purchasing their own health
insurance, whether or not they were offered insurance through their
employer.9\ In this way, the ACA has begun to sever the linkage
between employment and access to health care.
Indeed, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported that implementation of
"the ACA will reduce the total number of hours worked, on net, by
about 1.5 percent to 2.0 percent during the period from 2017 to 2024,
almost entirely because workers will choose to supply less labor ...
."92 That is, the ability to obtain access to health care by means
unrelated to their employment will enable workers to choose to work
less. 93 If the CBO's predictions come to pass, they will mark an
enormous victory for the ACA.

88.
89.
90.
91.

92.
93.

See id. § 2002, 124 Stat. 279-82.
See generally 26 U.S.C. § 7703 (2012) (providing the option for married individuals
to jointly file taxes).
Nat'l Fed'n ofIndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,2580,2593,2608 (2012).
See id. They, of course, will either have access to Medicaid if they live in a state that
has chosen to expand Medicaid, or if their income exceeds 100 percent of the Federal
Poverty Level, the opportunity to purchase insurance through the health care
marketplaces or exchanges and receive an Advance Premium Tax Credit. See
Premium Tax Credits: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL'y PRIORITIES 1-2 (July 2013), http://www.cbpp.orgifiles/QA-on-PremiumCredits.pdf.
CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, No. 4869, THE BUDGET & ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2014 TO
2024, at 117 (2014).
Id. at 117-18.
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Mandatory Benefits - Requirements for Employers

Our pre-ACA system of health care did not produce favorable
health outcomes. 94 Requiring that individuals be disabled or elderly
in order to receive access to health care through government
programs has caused the expenditure of a great deal of federal money
but has largely failed to prevent people from getting sick. 9s When an
applicant must establish an inability to work in order to access
benefits, the opportunity for prevention likely has been lost. The
same can be said of employer-based and, therefore, employercontrolled, health care. 96 Since the inception of employer-based
health care, employers have been more concerned with having a
workforce healthy enough to work than with participating in a
comprehensive, community-based health program designed to protect
the long-term health of employees. 97
As a part of the notion of "shared responsibility" (requiring all
actors in the health care system to contribute to near-universal access)
incorporated in the Affordable Care Act, the employer mandate
requires employers with fifty or more employees to provide their
employees with a minimum level of health insurance. 98 "Requiring
all or most employers to provide worker health insurance has been a
standard feature in universal [health] coverage schemes since
President Richard Nixon's 1973 plan. "99 Nevertheless, the employer
mandate has become the latest source of legal controversy during the
ACA's implementation lOO because it takes away the ability of
employers to decide whether to provide health insurance and what
services to cover.
In addition to imposing the employer mandate, the ACA
established new requirements for "group health plan[s]" that fall
94.

See, e.g., Editorial, The Shame ofAmerican Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17,2013),
http://www.nytimes.coml20 13/11I18/opinionithe-shame-of-american-heaithcare.html.
95.
See STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note I, at 1.
96. See The Shame of American Health Care, supra note 94. While the Inland Steel
decision gave unions a voice in the administration of health benefit plans beginning in
the late 1940s, the decline of unionized employment across the country has led to a
decline in the ability of workers to influence the operation of their health benefit
plans. See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 313.
97.
See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION,SUpra note 7, at 315.
98. See McDONOUGH, supra note 8, at 131-33.
99. Id. at 131.
100. See, e.g., Casey B. Mulligan, The Myth of ObamaCare's Affordability, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 8, 2014, 7:20 PM), http://online.wsj.comlarticles/casey-b-mulligan-the-mythof-obamacares-affordability-141 0218437.
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within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code Section 5000(b)(I).101
On July 19, 2010, the Department of Labor, the Department of Health
and Human Services, and the Department of the Treasury issued
interim final rules implementing the rules for group health plans
regarding preventive health services. 102 Like the statute, the interim
final rules required that plans cover preventive care as provided for in
guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA).103 HRSA ultimately delegated the creation
of the guidelines on this issue to the Institute of Medicine (10M). 104
On August 1, 2011, HRSA issued guidelines defining the preventive
services to be provided pursuant to the ACA's requirements. 105 The
guidelines required that preventive services include "[a]l1 Food and
Drug Administration [(FDA)] approved contraceptive methods,
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all
women with reproductive capacity."106
An employer offering to its employees a group health plan that fails
to provide the required coverage, including required contraceptive
coverage, thus became subject to a penalty of $100 per day for each
affected individual, beginning with the first plan year beginning on or
after January 1, 2014. 107 This has been called the contraception
mandate. 108 It is to be distinguished from the employer mandate that
requires larger employers to provide "full-time employees (and their
dependents) the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage
under an eligible employer-sponsored plan" or face annual excise tax
penalties of $2000 per full-time employee. 109
This requirement generated a fire storm of protest, as the Obama
administration struggled to find a way to maintain the contraception
26 u.s.c. § 5000(b)(I) (2012); Interim Rules for Group Health Plans and Health
Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventative Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726,
41,726-28 (July 19,2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
102. Interim Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Coverage of Preventative Services, 75 Fed. Reg. at 41,726.
103. Id. at 41,731, 41,733; see 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(I).
104. See Women's Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN.,
(citing Institute of Medicine: CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING
THE GAPS (The Nat'l Academies Press 2011)), www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last
visited Jan. 11,2015).
105. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventative Services, 77 Fed. Reg. 8,725, 8,725 (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54,
29 C.F.R. pt. 2590,45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
101.

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id
See 26 U.S.C. § 4980B note (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b), (e)(l) (2012).
See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(l).
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mandate while accommodating religious employers.llo On February
10,2012, the administration created a "Temporary Enforcement Safe
Harbor" that applied to group health plans sponsored by nonprofit
organizations that on and after February 10, 2012, do not provide
some or all of the contraception coverage required by rule. IliOn July
2, 2013, the administration issued the final rule to implement the
contraception mandate as it applies to religious employers.112
Under the final rule, "religious employers" are exempt from the
mandate if they are churches and religious orders "organized and
operate [d] as . . . nonprofit entit[ ies] . . . referred to in section
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code," as are certain
otherwise non-exempt religious organizations defined as "eligible
organizations."ll3 Thus, the final rule includes an "accommodation"
for non-profit organizations that hold themselves out as religious and
Such non-profit
oppose birth control for religious reasons. ll4
organizations do not have to provide contraceptive coverage in their
health insurance plans; instead, their employees will receive this
benefit directly from their insurance company.llS
Given our national history of allowing employers to define "health"
for their employees,116 it should not be surprising that there was
resistance to governmental attempts to require that specific forms of
preventive care be made available by all employers. Thus, despite
the Obama administration's efforts at accommodation, a number of
lawsuits were filed.117 In total, some 91 challenges were filed against
the contraception mandate, 46 from for-profit companies, and 45
110. See infra notes 116-120.
111. Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501,
16,501-{)3 (Mar. 21, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54,29 C.F.R. pt. 2590,45
C.F.R. pt. 147).
112. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg.
39,870, 39,870 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54,29 C.F.R. pts. 2510,
2590,45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156).
113. 45 C.F.R.§ 147.131(a)-(b)(4) (2013) (defining religious employers and eligible
organizations). The regulations exempt more than 335,000 religious organizations,
including churches and synagogues, from the contraceptive-coverage requirement. §
147.131(a); 158 CONGo REc. S375, S375, S377, S379 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2012)
(statements of Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, Sen. Barbara Boxer, Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
114. 45 C.F.R. § 147.13 I (b)(1)-(4).
115. Id. § 147.131(a), (c)(2).
116. See supra notes 21-26, 34-40, and accompanying text.
117. Andrea Flynn, In Contraceptive Mandate Challenges, Women's Health and Much
More is on the Line, NEXT NEW DEAL (Jan. 13,2014),
http://www.nextnewdeal.netlcontraceptive-rnandate-challengeswomen%E2%80%99s-health-and-much-more-line.
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from non-profit organizations. liB Those receiving the most attention
were those filed by for-profit corporations that asserted that forcing
them to provide contraception benefits without cost sharing to their
employees violated their right to religious liberty guaranteed by the
Free Exercise Clause 1l9 and the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act. 120
In the most prominent of these cases, the plaintiff, Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., a closely held corporation, argued for an exemption from
the contraception mandate because requiring it to offer certain types
of birth control to its workers violated the religious conscience of its
owners as expressed through the operation of the corporation. 121 The
plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby included the five members of the Green
family and the two businesses that they own: "Hobby Lobby Stores,
an arts-and-crafts chain, and Mardel, a chain of Christian
bookstores." 122 The businesses occupy over 500 stores and employ
more than 13,000 full-time employees.123 Hobby Lobby has annual
sales of $3 billion. 124
Neither Hobby Lobby nor Mardel is
unionized. 125
Similar claims ultimately were advanced by a variety of businesses
that engage in various forms of non-religious commerce, such as
selling outdoor power equipment,126 recycling scrap metal,127 and

118. [d.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion].").
120. Irin Cannon, Supreme Court Takes Up Birth Control Cases, MSNBC (Nov. 27, 2013,
3:30 PM), http://www.msnbc.comlthe-Iast-wordlbirth-control-courts-hands; Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
121. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114,1120-21 (10th Cir. 2013), aff'd,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
122. Brief for Respondents at *1, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (No. 13-354),2013 WL 5720377, at *1.
123. [d.
124. America's Largest Private Companies, Hobby Lobby Stores, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.comlcompanieslhobby-Iobby-stores/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
Its owner, David Green, is number 310 in Forbes Magazine's list of the wealthiest
people in the United States. He has a net worth of 4.5 billion dollars. Profile, David
Green, FORBES http://www.forbes.comlprofile/david-greenl (last visited Jan. II,
2015).
125. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 122, at *1-2.
126. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980,986 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
127. Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-3459-CV-SRED, 2012 WL 6951316, at *2 (W.O. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012), appeal dismissed, No. 131395 (8th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014).
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manufacturing wood cabinets,128 vehicle safety systems,129 and
HV AC equipment. 130 These challenges subsequently were addressed
by the Supreme Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., and
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 13l two cases in which
the appellate courts had reached opposite results regarding the
applicability of the contraception mandate to for-profit corporations
asserting religious objections.132
III. RECENT ACA LITIGATION: HOBBY LOBBY AND ITS
COUSINS
Despite these cases' focus on the exercise of religion, the same
health care themes persist: the employer's desire to define health and
the use of health care as a means to control the behavior of workers
versus government intervention requiring health care to be provided
to the "unworthy" or "undeserving." In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court came down squarely on the side of
allowing employers to continue to define "health" for their
employees, holding that "the contraceptive mandate, as applied to
closely held corporations, violates RFRA [Religious Freedom
Restoration Act]."133
A.

Hobby Lobby and Free Exercise: When Discrimination is Not
Discrimination

In the majority opinion, Justice Alito rejected the argument that the
owners of closely held companies were not protected in their free
exercise of religion by RFRA, even when acting as corporations. 134
Moreover, he found that a less restrictive alternative, the
accommodation developed for religious non-profits, could be applied
to closely held corporations to bring the mandate within the

128. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
724 F.3d 377, 381-82 (3d Cir. 2013), rev'd, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). Conestoga, of course, was ultimately consolidated for
hearing with Hobby Lobby before the Supreme Court.
129. Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 852 (7th Cir. 2013).
130. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (D. Colo. 2012), aff'd, 542 F.
App'x 706 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014).
131. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2755 (2014).
132. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 377; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114,
1116 (10th Cir. 2013), aff'd, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014).
133. 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
134. See id. at 2772-73.
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requirements of RFRA. 135 Further, the Court determined that closely
held, for-profit corporations are "persons" intended to be protected by
RFRA.136 To reach this conclusion, Justice Alito emphasized the fact
that HHS conceded that a non-profit corporation can be a person
within the meaning of RFRA, noting that the profit motive does not
prevent corporations from engaging in charitable and religious
activities. 137
While the Court's decision is notable because it extends the
protections of RFRA to corporations, its greatest significance may lie
in its restoration of power to employers to define "health" and
determine the health care needs of their employees. Tellingly, the
Court affords almost complete deference to the asserted religious
beliefs of the plaintiffs. 138 "[I]n these cases, the Hahns and Greens
and their companies sincerely believe that providing the insurance
coverage demanded by the HHS regulations lies on the forbidden side
of the line, and it is not for us to say that their religious beliefs are
mistaken or insubstantial. "139 This effectively gives away the entire
game, as the Court essentially claims that its "narrow function" is
only to determine whether the employer's definition of health reflects
an honest religious conviction. 140
In conducting its RFRA analysis, the Court assumed that the
government had a compelling interest in guaranteeing cost-free
access to contraception. 141 However, it appears to have done so
primarily to avoid talking about contraception as a gender
discrimination issue. 142 This approach is not lost on Justice Ginsburg
who, in response, leads the first section of her dissenting opinion with
the words: "'The ability of women to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives. "'143 Indeed, while Justice
Ginsburg provides an estimate of the cost of an intra-uterine device
(IUD) in her opinion,l44 Justice Alito refuses to rely on amici for such
information and blames HHS for failing to provide any estimate of
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

141.
142.
143.
144.

ld. at 2780.
ld. at 2769.
Id. at 2770-71.
!d. at 2779.
Id.
ld. at 2757 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
716 (1981)).
Id. at 2780.
See id. at 2779.
Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)).
Id. at 2800 n.22.
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the average cost per employee of contraception or of the number of
employees who might be affected because they work for corporations
like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga. 145 As a result, his is an opinion
which asserts strongly that a religious employer may discriminate
against women in defining what health care it will provide for its
employees but which simultaneously insists that it does not overrule
any anti-discrimination statutes-at least, not any regarding race. 146
Certainly, it remains to be seen whether the Americans with
Disabilities Act,147 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,148 the Fair Labor
Standards Act,149 and the Federal Occupational Safety and Health
Act l50 will be subject to a future challenges based on RFRA.151
Until Hobby Lobby, it had been the rule that '''[t]he First
Amendment ... gives no one the right to insist that, in pursuit of their
own interests, others must conform their conduct to his own religious
necessities. "'152 Again, however, our recurring national health care
themes appear to have trumped all prior precedent. Thus, the Hobby
Lobby decision grants employers a unique religious license, in that
they can impose a kind of tax on the employees who do not share
their beliefs. 153
In their brief, the owners of Conestoga Wood Specialties
complained of being required to "purchase religiously objectionable
products for others' use."154 However, granting them a conscientious
exemption to the contraception mandate imposes on the conscience
of their company's 950 employees. 155 In their briefs before the Court,
both Hobby Lobby and Conestoga sought to diminish this argument
by emphasizing that their religious beliefs are well known and
permeate their business practices, implying that employees who do
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

152.

153.

154.

155.

Id. at 2776 (majority opinion).
See id. at 2783.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2012).
42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012).
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012).
See Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty 45-46 (Aug. 2013)
(unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=2327919.
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (alteration in original)
(quoting Otten v. BaIt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953».
See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an
Exemption/or Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANe 51, 57-59 (2014).
Brief for Petitioners at 14-15, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 134 S.
Ct. 678 (2014) (No. 13-356),2014 WL 173487.
See Corbin, supra note 151, at 43.
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not share those beliefs are not likely to want to be employed by their
companies. 156 However, if that were true, then there would be no
need to oppose the contraception mandate. In accordance with the
owners' views, no employees would seek to purchase the
contraceptives, and there would be no danger of the owners having to
purchase religiously objectionable products. In fact, economic reality
dictates that the owners' claims are not true: their employees hold
diverse religious beliefs, some of which conflict with their own. 157
Herein lies the chief problem with corporate religious freedom: the
disparity in power between the owners of large corporations and their
employees makes it likely that wealthy owners will enjoy religious
liberty, but their employees will not. 158 Under the Court's decision,
the Hahns and the Greens now may exercise their religious freedom
by reaching into some of the most intimate details of their
employees' lives and by dictating certain behaviors. While both
families have insisted that they want to provide health insurance to
their employees and wish only to impose the limitations dictated by
their conscience and faith, I 59 this is merely another method of
drawing a distinction between the deserving and "undeserving poor."
As noted earlier, "[t]he undeserving poor have a very old history.
They represent the enduring attempt to classify poor people by
merit."160 Characterizing lower class or working class individuals as
morally suspect and, particularly, sexually promiscuous, has been an
American tradition. 161 Implicit in the notion that employees of
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga share the religious views of their
employer is the idea that good employees will seek to work their way

156. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 154, at 12; Brief for Respondents, supra note
122, at 8-9, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (No. 13-354),2014
WL 546899.
157. See Corbin, supra note 151, at 43-44.
158. ld.
159. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 154, at 5; Brief for Respondents, supra note 122,
at 9-10.
160 . KATZ, supra note 33, at 1.
161. See id. at 2; see also Aaron Blake, Huckabee: Dems Think Women Can '/ Control
Their Libido, WASH. POST (Jan. 23,2014), http://www.washingtonpost.comlblogs/
post-politics/wp/2014/01/23lhuckabee-dems-think-women-cant-control-their-libidol
("If the Democrats want to insult the women of America by making them believe that
they are helpless without Uncle Sugar coming in and providing for them a
prescription each month for birth control because they cannot control their libido or
their reproductive system without the help of the govemment, then so be it .... "
(quoting Mike Huckabee)). This quote reveals "biological citizenship" writ large.
Government health care carries such a stigma that, in Mr. Huckabee's view, offering it
to someone is an insult. See supra Part I.D.
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up in society by emulating their bosses, who once more have the
authority to define their employees' health.
B.

The Little Sisters of the Poor Cases

In its decision in Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court left open
the possibility of a second type of successful challenge to the ACA's
contraception mandate. 162 Those cases are still working their way
through the lower COurtS. 163 Instead of for-profit corporations, these
cases involve non-profit religious organizations that do not meet the

162. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2782 (2014) ("We do not
decide today whether an approach of this type complies with RFRA for purposes of
all religious claims."). Indeed, three days after the decision in Hobby Lobby was
issued, the Court temporarily enjoined the religious non-profit accommodation in
Wheaton College v. Burwell. Wheaton Coli. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807
(2014). In its order, the Court exempts Wheaton College, a religious non-profit, from
having to comply with the self-certification procedure mandated by the
accommodation. Id. Instead, Wheaton is required merely to inform the government
that it is exempt from the contraception mandate. Id. Coming so soon after the
Court's decision in Hobby Lobby, in which Justice Kennedy premised his decisive
concurrence on the existence of the religious non-profit exemption as a less restrictive
means of fulfilling the government's interest in ensuring women's access to necessary
preventive care, the Wheaton College injunction inspired a blistering dissent from
Justice Sotomayor. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Adam Liptak, Birth Control
Order Deepens Divide Among Justices, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2014)
http://www.nytimes.coml20 14/07/04/us(politics(supreme-court-order-suspendscontraception-rule-for-christian-college.html. Justice Alito's Hobby Lobby opinion,
coupled with Justice Kennedy's concurrence, briefly had seemed to suggest that the
accommodation procedure for religious non-profits would meet with the Court's
approval when the cases addressing it reached the Court. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at
2763; id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Wheaton College injunction
suggests otherwise. Id.
163. The cases involving religious non-profits largely focus on the mechanics of the
process by which those entities can claim an exclusion from the contraception
mandate. See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-2611-WJMBNB, 2013 WL 6839900, at *8 (D. Colo. Dec. 27, 2013) (order denying injunction),
appeal docketed, No. 13-1540. (lOth Cir. Dec. 27,2013), injunction granted pending
appeal, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (Jan. 24, 2014) (mem.) (order issuing injunction pending
appeal in the Tenth Circuit). Plaintiffs in those cases contend that the process of
certifying that they are exempt organizations is unacceptable because the certification
then enables employees to seek access to contraception through third party insurance
companies. Id. at *3. In Little Sisters of the Poor, the Court enjoined the Government
from requiring the plaintiffs to comply with the contraception mandate while the case
is pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Little Sisters
of the Poor, 134 S. Ct. at 1022 (2014) (order granting injunction pending final
disposition of the appeal).
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definition of religious employers.l64 In one such case, for example,
the plaintiffs, the Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged in
Denver, Colorado; the Little Sisters of the Poor, Baltimore,
Maryland; Christian Brothers Services; and Christian Brothers
Employee Benefit Trust, filed a class action lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado. 165 The complaint
defines the proposed class as those employers:
(i) that have adopted or in the future adopt the Christian
Brothers Employee Benefit Trust to provide medical
coverage for their "employees" or former employees and
their dependents ... (ii) that are or could be reasonably
construed to be "eligible organizations" within the meaning
of the [final rule on the mandate] . . . and (iii) are not
"religious employers" within the meaning of the [final rule
on the mandate]. 166
Like other non-profit religious organizations, the plaintiffs argue
that providing the certification that would exempt them from
complying with the contraception mandate makes them participants
in the sin in which their employees engage by using birth control. 167
What appears to be significant about the Little Sisters of the Poor
case, however, can be gleaned from the complaint and its definition
of the class. 168 By constructing a class that includes only employers
that adopt or will adopt the Christian Brothers Employee Benefit
Trust as their benefits administrator, the plaintiffs and their counsel
announce their commercial intentions. 169 The real fear of the
Christian Brothers Employee Benefit Trust appears to be not that it
will be forced to comply with the contraception mandate,170 but rather

164. See, e.g., Little Sisters o/the Poor, 2013 WL 6839900, at *2-3, *8 (holding that the
plaintiffs faU under the classification of "eligible organizations" rather than "religious
employers").
165. Id. at *l.
166. Complaint at 4, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 6839900 (D. Colo.
2013) (No. 1:13CV02611).
167. See Little Sisters o/the Poor, 2013 WL 6839900, at *9.
168. Little Sisters o/the Poor, Complaint, supra note 166, at l.
169. See id. at *4.
170. In denying the injunction ultimately granted by Justice Sotomayor, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted that aU of the plaintiff entities in the case would
be exempt from the contraception mandate. Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, No.
13-1540 (lOth Cir. Dec. 31, 2013) (order denying preliminary injunction), injunction
granted pending appeal, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014).
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that implementation of the ACA's mandate will put it out of
business. 171
The Christian Brothers Employee Benefit Trust has developed a
niche market providing health benefits to Catholic non-profits that
wish to provide health insurance to their employees while remaining
in compliance with Catholic teachings prohibiting coverage for
contraception, sterilization, abortifacients, and related education and
counseling.172 The Trust covers more than 5,000 active employees at
more than 200 Catholic employers.173 If the contraception mandate is
upheld because of the accommodation for non-profit religious
organizations, there would no longer be a market for the Trust's
services. 174 If the Little Sisters case reaches the Supreme Court, it
may present the question of whether RFRA requires the government
to protect the market share of non-profit religious organizations that
enable religious non-profits to define health and appropriate health
care for their employees.

C.

Halbig and its Threat to the A CA

Despite, or perhaps because of, predictions such as those made by
the CBO,175 employers seem determined to resist relinquishing the
power that their longstanding control over employee access to
healthcare has provided them. Another line of cases has arrived at
the Supreme Court under the caption King v. Burwell. 176 It was
thought that the Supreme Court would wait to weigh in on the issues
raised in King until there was a split between United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal. 177 Such a split had been anticipated after Halbig v.
Burwell, in which the plaintiffs sought to eliminate tax subsidies for
low-income individuals who purchase health insurance through the

171. Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Preliminary Injunction at *3, Little Sisters of the
Poor, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014) (No. 13A691), 2014 WL IOS373.
172. Little Sisters of the Poor, Complaint, supra note 166, at *4.
173. Id.
174. Id. at *2.
175. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
176. Case No. 14-114. On November 7,2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the King case, with oral arguments expected to be held in March 2015 and a decision
expected by late Jlme or early July 2015.
177. See Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear New Challenge to Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.coml20 1411110S/us/politics/supreme-court-to-hear-newchallenge-to-health-law.html.
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federal exchange. 178 The plaintiffs in Halbi~ lost in federal district
court,179 but won their appeal before a three-judge panel in the Court
of Appeals. 180 On the same day that the three-judge panel in Halbi~
issued its ruling striking down the challenged regulation, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion in
King v. Burwell, upholding the challenged regulation. 181 However,
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia chose to rehear the Halbig case en bane and vacated the decision in favor of the
plaintiffs. 182 Undeterred by the loss of this circuit split, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to address the subsidy issue raised in both
Kin~ and Halbi~, and perhaps seize the opportunity to take
subsidized health care away from millions of Americans who have
enjoyed receiving it under the ACA.183
While the cases before the Court raise the same issues, Halbig is
emblematic of the underlying struggle. Both the identity of some
parties and the convoluted theory of the case convey the stubbornness
with which employers continue to challenge the ACA, seeking to
wrest their control of access to health care back from the federal
government. In Halbi~, a former senior policy adviser to the
Department of Health and Human Services under President George
W. Bush filed suit, along with (among others) one of the former
plaintiffs in NFIB v. Sebelius, in order to challenge U.S. Treasury
regulation 26 C.F.R. ~ 1.36B-2(a), issued pursuant to the ACA. 184
The challenged regulation provides that lower income individuals
seeking to purchase insurance through the federal exchanges are
entitled to receive subsidies paid through the tax system to defray the
178.

Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-623,2014 WL 129023, at *1, *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 15,2014),

rev'd, 758 F. 3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and reh 'g en banc granted, judgment vacated,
No. 14-5018,2014 WL 4627181 (Sept. 4, 2014).
Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-623,2014 WL 129023, at *1, *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 15,2014),
rev'd, 758 F. 3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and reh 'g en banc granted, judgment vacated,
No. 14-5018,2014 WL 4627181 (Sept. 4, 2014).
180. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), reh'g en banc granted, judgment
vacated, No. 14-5018,2014 WL 4627181 (Sept. 4, 2014).
181. Halbig, 758 F.3d 390; King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014).
182. Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-623,2014 WL 129023, at *1, *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 15,2014),
rev'd, 758 F. 3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and reh 'g en banc granted, judgment vacated,
No. 14-5018,2014 WL 4627181 (Sept. 4, 2014).
183. LINDA 1. BLUMBERG, JOHN HOLAHAN & MATTHEW BERGMAN, HALBIG v BURWELL:
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ACA COVERAGE AND SUBSIDIES 1-2 (Urban Inst. et al.
eds., 2014), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.orglUploadedPDF/413183Halbig-v-Burwell-Potential-Implications-for-ACA-Coverage-and-Subsidies.pdf
(estimating that 7.3 million people could lose subsidies if the plaintiffs in Halbig
ultimately prevail).
184. See Complaint ~ 4, Halbig, 2014 WL 129023 (No. 13-623),2013 WL 1874720.
179.
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cost of purchasing insurance. 185 The plaintiffs claim that the
challenged regulation exceeds the authority granted by the ACA,
which they contend allows the federal government to provide tax
subsidies only to individuals who purchase insurance "through an
Exchange established by a State."186 Further, they assert that the
challenged regulation harms them because the availability of tax
subsidies enables the federal government to enforce both the
employer mandate and the individual mandate. 187 More specifically,
they allege that, without the availability of subsidies, the federal
government could not compel individuals to purchase health
insurance because it would be unaffordable without the subsidies. 188
In addition, the federal government could not force large employers
to provide their employees with health care and impose fines if they
receive subsidies from the exchange if subsidies cannot be
provided. 189 Thus, the theory presented by the plaintiffs in the new
Supreme Court cases neatly entwines the roles of state government
and employers in controlling the access of workers to health care: by
refusing to establish its own exchange, through which employees
could purchase health insurance independently from their employers,
a state government can ensure that employers are not subject to the
employer mandate and that the individual mandate will not be
enforceable. Workers again will be left to look to the beneficence of
their employers or their state government to have access to health
care.
IV. ENABLING A NEW PATH: CASTING THE ACA AS ANTISUBORDINA TION LEGISLATION
Path dependence arises from history. Past choices influence and
define present and future ones. This process creates narrative, as
justifications must be developed for ongoing reliance on past
precedents. 190 As has been shown above, the health care narratives
that define our system are extraordinarily powerful. Thus, in order to

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(a) (2013).
Halbig, Complaint, supra note 184, '\1'\129, 40.
Id. '\17.
Id. '\15.
Id. '\16.
See generally HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT passim (2006) (discussing in detail scientific racism-experiments and
supposed research intended to confirm the inferiority of blacks).
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prevail in the new sets of challenges to the ACA, advocates must
develop new narratives.
Those narratives can be developed by explaining the "why" of the
ACA. The statute alters the status quo, imposing change and
regulation in myriad ways. But why is that change necessary? One
need only review the President's botched promise that, "if you like
your health care, you can keep it," to comprehend Americans' grave
discomfort with, if not fear of, change in their health care system. 191
Accordingly, it can only help the implementation of the ACA to
explain why the changes it requires are necessary. As described in
Parts I and II, so much of what defines our health care system results
from our national history of racial and gender animus. l92 The only
way to overcome that past is to acknowledge its role in creating our
system and then to take conscious steps away from it. Antisubordination theory193 offers an approach to doing so.
"[S]lavery was an exploitative economic relationship based on the
ideology of racial supremacy . . .. "194 During Reconstruction,
Congress sought to address the link between economic exploitation
and race, but failed to prevent the rise of the Jim Crow system in the
South. 195 Throughout much of the twentieth century, "blacks
experienced the same pattern of racial and economic subordination
that had characterized the institution of slavery."196 Even after
numerous civil rights victories in the courts and Congress, as well as
the election of an African American President, African Americans
still have lower life expectancies and health outcomes than whites,
and women still have lower salaries and pay more for preventive
health care than men. 197 The concept of "anti-subordination" seeks to

191. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the Affordable
Care Act (Nov. 14, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013111114/statement-president-affordable-care-act. Many individuals who
received notices that they could not keep their current health plans objected angrily,
even when they learned that they could obtain better coverage more cheaply through
the federal marketplaces and subsidies established by the ACA. Id.
192. See supra notes 30-32,65-67 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1007-10 (1986).
194. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment,
90 B.U. L. REv. 255, 263 (2010).
195. Id. at 277,286-87.
196. Id. at 263.
197. Brian D. Camozzi, Health Care Access, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 443,483 (2010);
Ruqaiijah Yearby, Breaking the Cycle of "Unequal Treatment" with Health Care
Reform: Acknowledging and Addressing the Continuation ofRacial Bias, 44 CONN. L.
REv. 1281, 1283-84, 1292 (2012).
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end "race or gender based practices that further the subordination of
those who have suffered a history of discrimination."198 Thus,
because the ACA challenges path dependence and loosens the links
between employment and access to health care, its implementation is
an anti-subordination project.
A.

Taking Back the Narrative

At times, the Obama Administration's defense of the ACA has
seemed far too timid. 199 If the Administration really wants to change
our health care system, it has to stand up for the ACA. It needs to
speak directly and forcefully about what is in issue in the ACA: the
right of individuals to define health for themselves and seek
appropriate care without fear of jeopardizing their employment. For
example, the amicus brief for the National Women's Law Center in
Conestoga Wood Specialties includes the following statements:
Employers that exclude women's preventive health services
from their health insurance plans while covering men's
preventive services discriminate against women. Such
exclusion means that women are denied the comprehensive
preventive health coverage provided to men. Moreover,
when effective contraception is not used, and unintended
pregnancy results, it is women who incur the attendant
physical burdens and medical risks of pregnancy, women
who disproportionately bear the health care costs of
pregnancy and childbirth, and women who often face
barriers to employment and educational opportunities as a
result of pregnancy. 200
There is nothing so straightforward and direct in the Solicitor
General's briefs. 201 Indeed, in its response brief in the Conestoga
Wood Specialties case, the Government expressed repeatedly that the
Hahns' beliefs were sincere. 202 Taking such a defensive posture
198. See Zietlow, supra note 194, at 266 n.63.
199. See Koeninger, supra note 10, at 177 n.276 (criticizing the administration for failing
to argue that the ACA was a civil rights enactment in NFIB v. Sebelius).
200. Brief for the National Women's Law Center & Sixty-Eight Other Organizations as
Amici Curiae in Support of the Government at 20, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356),2014 WL 333895, at *20.
201. Brieffor the Petitioners, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(No. 13-354),2014 WL 173486; Brief for the Respondents, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-356),2014 WL 546900.
202. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 201, at I, 7-8.
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turned out to be no way to shift the focus from wealthy employers to
their employees.
Quite simply, the Government seems to have failed to understand
the significance of severing the link between access to health care
and employment. As Justice Alito noted, the Government apparently
did not raise the question of whether the employers could have
complied with their consciences more cheaply by dropping insurance
and paying the fines than by purchasing insurance for their
employees that excluded contraception coverage. 203 Justice Alito also
points out that HHS failed to provide an estimate of the average cost
per employee of providing access to contraceptives or statistics. 204
Without these numbers, it was impossible to convey the impact of the
free exercise tax that female employees of businesses like Hobby
Lobby must pay to support their employers' free exercise of
religion. 205
In its Petitioner's brief, Conestoga Woods actually argued that
requiring a corporation to provide access to birth control in its
employee health plan amounts to government interference in the lives
of citizens.206 Moreover, the company argued that a woman's attempt
to secure access to preventive care through her employee health plan
is an infringement on the rights of her corporate bosses. 207 According
to Conestoga Wood Specialties, Title VII has no applicability in the
case. 20S Apparently, the Court also accepted this argument. 209
Thus, one can only conclude that the corporate opponents of the
ACA have stolen the debate from the government. The strategy
employed by Conestoga should have been anticipated by ACA
supporters. During the oral arguments for NFIB v. Sebelius, Justice
Kennedy famously asked:
I understand that we must presume laws are constitutional,
but, even so, when you are changing the relation of the
individual to the government in this, what we can stipulate

203. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2776.
204. Id. at 2780-81. In fact, it is Justice Ginsberg's dissent that notes that IUDs can cost
women more than $1000. Id. at 2800 n.22 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
205. See Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 153, at 57-59 (describing the costs imposed
on Hobby Lobby employees by the company's beliefs).
206. Brief for the Petitioners at 49-50, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014) (No. 13-356),2014 WL 173487.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 50.
209. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2773-74.
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is, I think, a unique way, do you not have a heavy burden of
justification to show authorization under the Constitution?210
Eventually, Justice Roberts referenced this language in his opinion,
finding that the Government had not met this burden of justification
and that the individual mandate could not be justified under the
commerce power.211 In doing so, Justice Roberts seemed to suggest
that the rights of individuals should be more highly valued than
having a coherent, sustainable health care system that benefits
everyone. 212 Thus, Justice Roberts arguably emboldened those
seeking to opt out of other mandatory aspects of the ACA. Ironically,
this encouragement seems to have empowered only wealthy
individuals, corporations, and religious organizations, not ordinary
citizens.213 Advocates for the ACA need to find ways to make the
ACA implementation cases about the rights of those who will benefit
from the ACA as it addresses the unfinished business of civil rights.

B.

Going on the Offensive

Rather than scrambling to defend the ACA from death by a
thousand cuts,214 ACA supporters need to find ways to affirmatively
support and promote it. While supporters of refusal clauses and other
restrictions view them as matters of providers' rights of conscience,
210. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-12, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov
loral_arguments/argument_transcripts/ll-398- Tuesday.pdf.
211. See Nat 'I Fed'n oflndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591.
212. Indeed, in their Brief, counsel for Hobby Lobby mock the notion that the government
has an interest in insuring a "comprehensive insurance system," claiming that the
government already has permitted so many exceptions and opt-outs that a
comprehensive system is impossible. Brieffor Respondents, supra note 122, at 34.
213. In a sense, Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence is now at war with itself. On the one
hand, the government may not use its commerce power to compel an individual to
purchase health insurance. See Nat 'I Fed'n oflndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2648 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, Jl, dissenting). But, on the other hand, corporations, in
accordance with the religious beliefs of their owners, can use the economic power that
corporate ownership provides them to deny individual women access to recommended
preventive care. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, l, concurring). Justice
Kennedy either appears to believe somewhat naively that corporations are a more
benign force than the federal government or that the extent to which one can exercise
individual rights should be dependent on personal wealth-hardly a position
consistent with the "fundamental proposition 'that all men are created equal .... ",
Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., III U.S. 746, 762 (1884) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
214. See supra Parts III.B., III.C.
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they can have significant negative consequences for women's health
and lead to poorer health outcomes.215 This needs to be publicized
and discussed. Commentators have noted that "[t]he most depressing
aspect of discussions surrounding the Hobby Lobby litigation is the
total failure to acknowledge the women who would be harmed by
RFRA exemptions from the Mandate."216 This cannot continue;
supporters need to find ways to bring affirmative litigation in order to
promote the ACA as anti-subordination legislation. In its amicus
brief, the National Women's Law Center notes that in 2000, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) considered and
upheld a Title VII challenge to an employer's refusal to include
contraception coverage in its employee health plan, even though the
plan otherwise included comprehensive coverage of prescription
drugs.217 Specifically, the EEOC found that Congress, in passing the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act,218 intended "to equalize employment
opportunities for men and women, and to address discrimination
against female employees that was based on assumptions that they
would become pregnant. "219 Because "[ c]ontraception is a means by
which a woman controls her ability to become pregnant," the EEOC
held that "the PDA's prohibition of discrimination in connection with
a woman's ability to become pregnant necessarily includes the denial
of benefits for contraception."22o
Where possible, challenges to employer attempts to opt out of ACA
requirements should be considered and pursued. Title VII would be a
likely avenue in cases involving the contraception mandate. Indeed,
employees facing the loss of access to preventive care benefits may
wish to intervene in pending actions. 221 Employees of corporations

'TRACY A. WEITZ, NAT'L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, HEALTH
CARE REFUSALS: UNDERMINING QUALITY CARE FOR WOMEN 8-9, 66 (2010), available
at http://www.healthlaw.orgipublicationslhealth-care-refusals-undermining-care-forwomen#. VBu_7y5dVY c.
216. Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 153, at 65.
217. See EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, DECISION ON COVERAGE OF
CONTRACEPTION 1, 5 (2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decisioncontraception.htrnl (finding that Respondents violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act by excluding insurance coverage for prescription contraceptive drugs and devices
in their health insurance plan).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) (amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy).
219. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 217, at 2-3.
220. Id.
221. See Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 153, at 65 & n.57 (noting that some female
Notre Dame students intervened in the school's lawsuit against the contraception
mandate).

215. See SUSAN BERKE FOGEL &
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who find their religious exercise infringed by their employers may
wish to challenge RFRA itself.222
The Hobby Lobby decision only affects federal law, and the
limitations imposed by RFRA only apply to federal actions. 223 Some
states have enacted their own contraceptive coverage requirements
that pre-date the ACA.224 Therefore, some closely held corporations
still may be required to provide contraceptive coverage to their
employees.225 ACA supporters can advance the anti-subordination
narrative by making sure that these requirements are enforced against
employers.
Finally, given the Obama Administration's inability to advocate
successfully for the rights of workers, especially women, against the
interests of their employers in order to make sure that their access to
health care is protected, feminists may wish to pursue a different path
entirely. It has been suggested in some quarters that, given the other
mechanisms put in place by the ACA, the employer mandate is not
necessarily needed to reduce the number of uninsured Americans. 226
Why not eliminate the employer mandate and sever the required
connection between employment and health care? Proponents of
eliminating the mandate argue that it would reduce employer
opposition to the ACA without significantly reducing insurance
coverage and would avoid some of the labor market distortions
caused by employers attempting to avoid the mandate's
requirements. 227 In order to protect their ability to define their own
health in the aftermath of Hobby Lobby, ACA supporters may need to

222. See Brief of The Freedom From Religion Foundation, Bishopaccountability.org,
Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, The Child Protection Project, The Foundation
to Abolish Child Sex Abuse, Survivors for Justice, and The Survivors Network of
Those Abused by Priests as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 34, Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354),2014 WL 333897
(urging the Court to hold that RFRA is unconstitutional).
223. CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., R43654, FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
BY CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS: IMPLICATIONS OF BURWELL v. HOBBY LOBBY STORES,
INC. 10 (2014), available at http://fas.orglsgp/crs/miscIR43654.pdf (addressing the
effect of the Court's decision under federal and state law).
224. Jd.
225. Id.
226. LINDA J. BLUMBERG ET AL., WHY NOT JUST ELIMINATE THE EMPLOYER MANDATE? 4
(Urban Inst. et al. eds., 2014), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
413117-Why-Not-Just-Eliminate-the-Employer-Mandate.pdf (finding
that
the
Affordable Care Act's employer mandate is not necessarily needed to expand health
insurance coverage).
227. Jd. at 2-4.
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take the radical step of actively lobbying against the implementation
of one of the ACA' s chief provisions. 228
C. How We Talk About The ACA Matters

Last year's ACA implementation debacle is a reminder that no
matter how good a law or policy might be, it still must be
implemented efficiently in order to have public support and to
achieve its intended outcomes. 229 One could argue that if Obamacare
had rolled out smoothly, there never would have been any
controversy about some consumers not being able to keep their
current insurance. If the ACA is to chart new paths for the delivery
of healthcare, consumers must understand what is at stake.
Supporters of the Affordable Care Act should be concerned about
what Ericson and Kessler have called "the articulation effect" of
government policy; that is, how the articulation of government policy
affects behavior. 230 Ericson and Kessler studied the effect of the
debate over the ACA's requirement for individuals to purchase health
insurance. 231 They found that the controversy over the individual
228. See J.D. Harrison, Obamacare's Employer Mandate is Under Attackfrom Both Sides.
Will it Survive?, WASH. POST (June 10,2014), http://www.washingtonpost.coml
business/on-small-business/obamacares-employer-mandate-is-under-attack-fromboth-sides-will-it-survive/20 14/06/09/51 fc 194-ed85-11 e3-92b852344c12e8al_story.html. It must be noted, however, that House Republicans have
filed suit against President Obama regarding implementation of the ACA, and given
the difficulty of passing any legislation through the current Congress, it is not so easy
to envision how a repeal of the employer mandate could take place. See Alex Rogers,
House Grants Boehner Authority to Sue Obama, TIME (July 30, 2014)
http://time.coml306ll74lhouse-grants-boehner-authority-to-sue-obama/; United States
House of Representatives v. Bunvell, No.1: 14-cv-01967 (D.D.C., 2014), available at
https:lljonathanturley.files.wordpress.coml2014/11lhouse-v-burwell-d-d-c-complaintfiled.pdf (alleging that President Obama has overstepped his authority to fund the
ACA by not obtaining a congressional appropriation for the subsidies provided to
reduce the cost of purchasing insurance); see also Drew DeSilver, Congress Ends
Least-Productive Year in Recent History, PEW REs. CENTER (Dec. 23, 2013),
http://www.pewresearch.orglfuct-tank/20l3/l2l23/congress-ends-least-productive-year-inrecent-history1 (fmding that the 113th Congress has only passed 55 substantive laws,
which is the least number of passed laws in two decades).
229. See generally Press Release, President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on
the Affordable Care Act (Oct. 21,2013, 11:33 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/20 13/1 0/211remarks-president-affordable-care-act (acknowledging the
frustrations people faced when trying to use the ACA's insurance marketplace
website, Heathcare.gov, after its roll out on October 1, 2013).
230. Keith Marzilli Ericson & Judd B. Kessler, The Articulation Effect of Government
Policy: Health Insurance Mandates Versus Taxes (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 18913,2013).
231. Jd. at 3-4.
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mandate provision changed the political discourse during the period
from December 2011 to November 2012.232 Specifically, over the
course of that year, the description of the minimum coverage
requirement as a mandate, rather than a tax, lost effectiveness in
increasing the probability that an individual would purchase health
insurance.233 Prior to the controversy, individuals surveyed were
nearly 11 percent more likely to purchase insurance pursuant to a
policy articulated as a "mandate" rather than a taX. 234 After a year of
controversy over the provision, the mandate language became no
more effective than calling it a tax. 235 Ericson and Kessler estimate
that decreasing the likelihood that individuals will purchase insurance
might create a difference of as much as $1000 in the cost of annual
premiums for those who do purchase insurance; thus, they argue that
persuasion and public opinion management are crucial to achieving
policy objectives at lower COSt. 236
ACA supporters should take these findings very seriously and act.
They have allowed the debate over the ACA-which includes the
past and current Supreme Court and lower court cases and their
arguments-to be more about the rights of business owners than
about civil rights or the rights of those who benefit from the ACA.
To turn this tide, proponents must identify and create opportunities to
promote the ACA as anti-subordination legislation, protecting the
rights of workers, women, and minorities. Only by confronting and
discussing the historical precedents underlying our path-dependent
health care system can supporters of the ACA make a case for the
provisions of the ACA that will alter that path dependence.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See id. at 1,9-10,15.
Jd. at 12-13, 15.
Jd. at 1,4-5, 11.
Jd. at 15.
See id. at 11-13.

